Legal Aid Act changes providing financial assistance for the representation of detained patients both resulted from litigation under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It was successfully argued that patients detained for public protection should have access to a judicial hearing and that financial assistance for those without means was essential in order for the proceedings to be fair, just and respecting of the human rights of detained patients.

Legal aid before the tribunal, as with detention associated with suspected criminal behaviour, must be generally available because of the nature of the proceedings and their impact on the person detained. Unlike the pursuit of some claim in private law, it should not have to be justified, as Dr West suggests, by crudely testing the chances of the applicant succeeding. In any event, recent research conducted for the Lord Chancellor's Department has demonstrated that legal advocacy increases those chances by 20–35%.

With, for example, 45% of cases handled by the Southern MHRT Office having no patient representation at all the injustice to those detained would appear to be not too many lawyers but, shamefully, too few.

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References
2 Details supplied in 1991 by Clerk to the Mental Health Review Tribunal, Southern Region to Mental Health Sub-Committee of Law Society.

The patient's perspective
DEAR SIRS
I write in reply to David Pilgrim's letter (Psychiatric Bulletin, June 1991, 15, 370) concerning our study entitled 'Psychiatric In-patient Audit – The Patients' Perspective'.

I agree with him that when treating patients it is important to have a proper discussion of the beneficial and adverse effects of treatment. I think, for example, that if one is commencing a patient on long term depot injections, one would have to mention important adverse effects such as tardive dyskinesia, but this would be in the context of mentioning the low incidence of such a side effect and also the advantages of having the treatment.

He describes ward rounds as being an anachronistic ritual and although I would not use these exact words myself, I would agree with him that ward rounds are somewhat unsatisfactory and stultifying, even when attempts are made to make them user friendly.

I am not sure, however, whether there is a suitable alternative. If one considers the possibility of performing business rounds without the presence of patients, this might be considered more satisfactory. However, if decisions are made at these business rounds and are then conveyed to the patients subsequently, who then reject these decisions and recommendations, one could then find oneself involved in a rather tedious round of shuttle diplomacy between the patients and the members of staff attending the business round.

I certainly agree with him, however, that in future we have to listen much more carefully to what patients are telling us about our psychiatric services.

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The doctor in the Mental Health Review Tribunal
DEAR SIRS
Within the last year both Dr Woolf (1991) and I (Langley, 1990) have commented upon the role of doctors involved in the proceedings of Mental Health Review Tribunals. I would like to take the discussion a stage further.

Dr Woolf rightly differentiates between a clinical case conference and the proceedings of a Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT) (although with a holistic approach to patient care the difference might not be as great as at first appears). In a Tribunal the central issue is whether there is a current need for the patient to be detained. This is a matter of opinion for all concerned and, of course, any opinion may be disputed. Dr Woolf and I both suggest that, in his words, doctors can "take umbrage" when their judgements are challenged. In these circumstances it is worth examining further the process by which opinions are formed.

Whatever opinion (or judgement) is proposed, or decision reached, the view taken has to be justified by reasons that are sufficient to make the case. Judgements, both clinical and judicial, have to be based not only upon agreed facts (as far as they are ever ascertainable in psychiatry), but also on the probabilities attached to predicting from these facts (whether "hard" or "soft"), and an element of value judgement (about the acceptability of present and predicted behaviour, civil liberties etc).

I submit that the taking of umbrage occurs most often when difficulty is experienced, not in expressing an opinion, but in marshalling and presenting specific reasons for holding that opinion. This may